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LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW
Vijay K. Mago *
Nancy B. Sasser **
Allison M. Perry ***
I. INTRODUCTION
During the past year, there were several significant develop-
ments in labor and employment law at the federal level and rela-
tively few at the state level. Because the federal developments
will likely have a profound impact on employers and employees
throughout Virginia, they warrant significant discussion in this
survey. In addition to examining notable decisions from the Su-
preme Court of the United States, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit, the United States District Courts for
the Eastern and Western Districts of Virginia, the Supreme
Court of Virginia, and various circuit courts in Virginia, this sur-
vey also discusses the legislative changes that might impact em-
ployers or employees in Virginia.
Because this article constitutes a survey of labor and employ-
ment law, it is necessarily limited in depth and substantive scope,
as well as in temporal scope.
II. RETALIATION
Retaliation claims enjoy increasing popularity because they
frequently survive summary judgment, and the underlying ele-
ments are easy for jurors to grasp. Three recent decisions, two
from the Supreme Court of the United States and one from the
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Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, will make retaliation claims
even more popular by making them more accessible and easier to
prove.
First, in Crawford v. Metropolitan Government, the Supreme
Court of the United States expanded the reach of the "opposition
clause" of Title VII's anti-retaliation provision.' In addition to
prohibiting discrimination in employment on the basis of pro-
tected categories, Title VII prohibits retaliation by making it un-
lawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee (1)
"because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employ-
ment practice by this subchapter" (the "opposition clause"), or (2)
"because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated
in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under
this subchapter" (the "participation clause").'
In 2002, the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and David-
son County ("Metro") investigated rumors that Gene Hughes, the
school district employee relations director, was engaging in sex-
ual harassment.3 In the course of the investigation, a Metro
human resources officer asked Crawford whether she witnessed
any "inappropriate behavior" by Hughes,4 and Crawford described
numerous instances of sexually harassing behavior in response. 5
For instance, Hughes once responded to Crawford's greeting,
"'Hey Dr. Hughes, what's up?' by grabbing his crotch and saying,
'[Y]ou know what's up.'' 6 Crawford also informed the Metro
human resources officer that Hughes had "repeatedly 'put his
crotch up to [her] window;' and on one occasion he had entered
her office and 'grabbed her head and pulled it to his crotch.' 7
Although two other employees also described instances of sexual
harassment by Hughes, Metro took no action against him."
Instead, shortly following its investigation, Metro discharged
Crawford and both of the other employees who reported the
1. 555 U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 846, 849 (2009).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006).
3. Crawford, 555 U.S. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 849.
4. Id. (quoting Crawford v. Metro. Gov't, 211 F. App'x 373, 374-75 (6th Cir. 2006)).
5. Id. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 849.
6. Id. (quoting Crawford, 211 F. App'x at 375 & n.1).
7. Id.
8. Id. at -_, 129 S. Ct. at 849.
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sexual harassment, citing embezzlement as the basis for
Crawford's discharge.9
In response, Crawford exhausted her administrative remedies
and commenced the action that ultimately led to this decision. 1°
In her claim, Crawford alleged that her discharge violated both
the opposition clause and the participation clause of Title VII's
anti-retaliation provision.", The United States District Court for
the Middle District of Tennessee granted summary judgment for
Metro, holding that Crawford's participation in Metro's internal
investigation did not satisfy the opposition clause because she
never "'instigated or initiated any complaint,' but had 'merely
answered questions by investigators in an already-pending
internal investigation, initiated by someone else.""2 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, agreeing
that because Crawford had not "opposed" any unlawful
employment practice, she was not entitled to protection under
Title VII's anti-retaliation provision.
13
The Supreme Court reversed unanimously and described the
Sixth Circuit's rule-protecting an employee who initiates a
report of sexual harassment, but not one who reports the same
conduct in response to a question-as "freakish."1 4 The Court held
that the opposition clause covered Crawford's elicited comments
"as an ostensibly disapproving account of sexually obnoxious
behavior toward her by a fellow employee, an answer she says
antagonized her employer to the point of sacking her on a false
pretense." 5
The Court supported its decision by using Webster's Dictionary
to dissect the "ordinary meaning" of the term "oppose," which
means "'to resist or antagonize ... ; to contend against; to con-
front; resist; withstand."16 Because "'[olppose' goes beyond 'active,
9. Id.
10. Id. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 849-50.
11. Id.
12. Id. at -, 129 S. Ct. at 850 (quoting Crawford v. Metro. Gov't, No. 3:03-0996, 2005
WL 6011557, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 6, 2005)).
13. See id. The Sixth Circuit, citing its own precedent, held that the opposition clause
required "active, consistent 'opposing' activities to warrant ... protection against retalia-
tion." Id. (quoting Crawford v. Metro. Gov't, 211 F. App'x 373, 376 (6th Cir. 2006)).
14. Id. at_, 129 S. Ct. at 849, 851, 853.
15. Id. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 850-51.
16. Id. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 850 (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 1710 (2d
ed. 1958)).
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consistent' behavior," there is "no reason to doubt that a person
can 'oppose' by responding to someone else's question."17 Equally
compelling, if "an employee who reported discrimination in
answering an employer's questions could be penalized with no
remedy," then "prudent employees would have a good reason to
keep quiet about Title VII offenses against themselves or against
others ."1
The Court's decision in Crawford will likely have a major
impact on retaliation claims, because it broadens the scope of the
opposition clause and, thereby, makes this popular claim
available to an even greater pool of litigants. Curiously, although
complainants are not the only parties entitled to sue for retali-
ation, the Court rejected the argument that a ruling for Crawford
would make employers less likely to investigate claims of discrim-
ination or harassment.19
The Court also analyzed retaliation claims in CBOCS West,
Inc. v. Humphries.20 Humphries, a former assistant manager of a
Cracker Barrel restaurant, brought suit against CBOCS West,
Inc. ("CBOCS"), the owner of Cracker Barrel, claiming he was
terminated on the basis of his race and because he complained
about the discharge of another African-American. 2' After exhaust-
ing administrative remedies, Humphries brought suit under Title
VII and the "equal contract rights" provision of § 1981 of the
United States Code. 22
The district court dismissed the Title VII claims for failure to
pay filing fees and granted CBOCS's motion for summary judg-
ment on the § 1981 claims.23 The United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit upheld the award of summary judgment
17. Id. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 851 ("Countless people were known to 'oppose' slavery be-
fore Emancipation, or are said to 'oppose' capital punishment today, without writing public
letters, taking to the streets, or resisting the government.").
18. Id. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 852. Because the Court's holding ultimately rested on the
opposition clause, the Court did not reach Crawford's "argument that the Sixth Circuit
misread the participation clause as well." Id. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 853.
19. See id. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 852.
20. 553 U.S. __, 128 S. Ct. 1951, 1954 (2008).
21. Id. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 1954.
22. Id. Section 1981 is a "longstanding civil rights law, first enacted just after the Civ-
il War." Id. It provides, "All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have
the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts.., as is enjoyed
by white citizens." 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2006).
23. CBOCS, 553 U.S. at __, 128 S. Ct. at 1954.
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for CBOCS in regard to the direct discrimination claim, but
remanded the § 1981 claim for trial.24 In doing so, the Seventh
Circuit rejected CBOCS's argument that § 1981 could not serve as
the basis for a retaliation claim.15 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari to resolve whether § 1981 prohibits retaliation against
an individual who complains about discrimination involving
others. 6
Seven of the Court's nine Justices answered this question
affirmatively based on a consideration of stare decisis.21 The
Court reached this result based on the following analysis:
(1) [In 1969, Sullivan,28 as interpreted by Jackson, 9 recognized that
§ 1982 encompasses a retaliation action; (2) this Court has long
interpreted §§ 1981 and 1982 alike; 0 (3) in 1989, Patterson,31
without mention of retaliation, narrowed § 1981 by excluding from
its scope conduct, namely post-contract-formation conduct, where
retaliation would most likely be found; ... ; and (4) since 1991, the
lower courts have uniformly interpreted § 1981 as encompassing
retaliation actions.
3 2
The Court rejected each of the arguments that CBOCS raised.
First, CBOCS argued the express language of § 1981 did not pro-
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at __, 128 S. Ct. at 1954-55.
28. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969). Sullivan analyzed 42
U.S.C. § 1982, a Code provision enacted simultaneously with § 1981 that was designed to
protect the rights of black citizens. Sullivan, 396 U.S. at 235; see CBOCS, 553 U.S. at __,
128 S. Ct. at 1955; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2006). The Sullivan Court decided that §
1982 provided grounds to sue for retaliation where a white male was terminated from his
employment with a corporation when he stood up for a black man who was not allowed to
enter a private park owned by the corporation. Sullivan, 396 U.S. at 237; see CBOCS, 553
U.S. at __, 128 S. Ct. at 1955.
29. Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 176 (2005) ("[I]n Sullivan we
interpreted a general prohibition on racial discrimination [in § 19821 to cover retaliation
against those who advocate the rights of groups protected by that prohibition.").
30. In its analysis, the Court looked to Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976), which
held that §§ 1981 and 1982 were similar in that they both addressed private conduct. See
CBOCS, 553 U.S. at _, 128 S. Ct. at 1955 (citing Runyon, 427 U.S. at 173). The Court
also noted that it "has construed §§ 1981 and 1982 alike because it has recognized the sis-
ter statutes' common language, origin, and purposes." CBOCS, 553 U.S. at __, 128 S. Ct.
at 1956. Specifically, "[l]ike § 1981, § 1982 traces its origin to § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of
1866... [and] represents an immediately post-Civil War legislative effort to guarantee the
then newly freed slaves the same legal rights that other citizens enjoy." Id.
31. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
32. CBOCS, 553 U.S. at -, 128 S. Ct. at 1957-58.
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vide a cause of action for retaliation.33 In rejecting this argument,
the Court noted that § 1982 has been held to encompass claims of
retaliation, even though the language does not address such
claims, and that another civil rights statute is read broadly to
include protection from retaliation despite the absence of explicit
language4.3  CBOCS also argued that Congress must have
intended to omit a retaliation claim from § 1981 because
Congress did not include any specific language allowing such a
claim when it reenacted the statute in 1991. 35 To support this
argument, CBOCS noted that Congress included explicit anti-
retaliation language in all other civil rights statutes.36 The Court
rejected this argument on grounds that in light of the Sullivan
decision, it was more likely that Congress saw no need to include
explicit language.3 1
The Court also rejected CBOCS's claim that if § 1981 were
applied to "employment-related retaliation actions," it would
"overlap with Title VII."3 The Court noted that a similar "over-
lap" exists with respect to "employment-related direct discrim-
ination," and that it has previously recognized a "necessary
overlap" between Title VII and § 1981. 39 Further, the Court has
held that "the 'remedies available under Title VII and under §
1981, although related, and although directed to most of the same
ends, are separate, distinct, and independent.' 4
Based on these principal reasons, the Court agreed with the
Seventh Circuit and ruled in favor of Humphries, holding that §
1981 encompasses retaliation claims. 41 Obviously, this ruling will
allow employees to bring retaliation claims under Title VII, as
well as under § 1981. This ruling is especially significant because
§ 1981 has a longer statute of limitations than Title VII and does
not include the damage caps applicable under Title VII.42 Further,
§ 1981 is ubiquitous-it applies to all employers, regardless of
33. Id. at __, 128 S. Ct. at 1958.
34. See id. (citing Jackson, 544 U.S. at 173-74).
35. Id. at 1959.
36. Id.; see, e.g., National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (2006).
37. CBOCS, 553 U.S. at __, 128 S. Ct. at 1959.
38. See id. at -, 128 S. Ct. at 1960.
39. Id. (citing Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 181 (1989)).
40. Id. (quoting Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 461 (1975)).
41. Id. at __, 128 S. Ct. at 1961.
42. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006), and Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541
U.S. 369, 382 (2004), with 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(e)(1) (2006).
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size-whereas Title VII applies only to employers with fifteen or
more employees. 43 Because employees will no longer be confined
by the limitations of Title VII, they will enjoy greater flexibility in
prosecuting claims of retaliation.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
addressed retaliation claims in Buckley v. Mukasey by stressing
the relevance of prior litigation to show retaliatory animus.41
Buckley, an African-American woman working as a special agent
for the Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA"), had been involved in a
class action in 1977, alleging race discrimination against the
DEA.45 In the current action, Buckley sought to introduce
evidence of the prior litigation, in an attempt to evince the DEA's
motive for retaliation. 41
The lower court did not allow Buckley to introduce the
evidence, but the Fourth Circuit disagreed, 47 holding that the
lower court "erred as a matter of law in relying on the Federal
Rules of Evidence to limit" evidence of a separate discrimination
claim being offered to establish retaliatory animus in the current
action.48 According to the Fourth Circuit, claims "based on retalia-
tion for pursuing discrimination claims in the past[,I are inextric-
ably linked to past acts of discrimination."49 Thus, "[blecause such
evidence of prior bad acts speaks directly to the defendant's mo-
tive or intent to retaliate, such evidence must be admitted if the
plaintiff is to have any real chance of proving her retaliation
claim."50 In Buckley, the court held the plaintiff-employee was en-
titled to a new trial because this error affected the employee's
"substantial rights by rendering her unable to cogently demon-
strate ... litigation-related retaliatory animus."51
Stated simply, nothing in the Federal Rules of Evidence sup-
ported the district court's decision to keep out evidence of the ear-
lier litigation. 52 The evidence was "unquestionably '[r]elevant'
43. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006), with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2006).
44. 538 F.3d 306, 318 (4th Cir. 2008).
45. Id. at 309-10.
46. Id. at 314-15.
47. Id. at 315, 319.
48. Id. at 320.
49. Id. at 319.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 320-21.
52. See id. at 318-20.
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within the meaning of Rule 401" to establishing retaliatory ani-
mus. 53 Under Rule 404(b), such evidence of other wrongs or acts is
admissible to show motive and intent.54 The evidence should not
have been excluded under Rule 403, because the risk of unfair
prejudice to the defendants did not outweigh the importance of
the evidence to Buckley's claims.55 Additionally, the court noted, a
limiting instruction could have been used to caution the jury that
the evidence was to be considered only as evidence of retaliatory
animus.56
III. TITLE VII AND THE ADEA
The Supreme Court's decision in Meacham v. Knolls Atomic
Power Laboratory might lead to more disparate-impact claims
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), be-
cause it requires an employer to demonstrate that it used reason-
able factors other than age to arrive at the personnel decision at
issue." Although Meacham may lead to more disparate-impact
claims under the ADEA and also make it more difficult for em-
ployers to obtain summary judgment on such claims, Ilozor v.
Hampton University requires employees to establish age discrim-
ination by producing evidence sufficient for a jury to conclude
that age was the motivating factor. 58
A. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act
In Meacham, the federal government ordered Knolls Atomic
Power Laboratory ("KAPL") to reduce its workforce for the 1996
fiscal year. 59 In response, KAPL told its managers to select those
to be laid off by scoring them on three scales including flexibility,
critical skills, and performance.60 Of the thirty-one salaried em-
ployees laid off, thirty of them were at least forty years old.6 1
53. Id. at 319.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 320.
56. Id.
57. 554 U.S. __, 128 S. Ct. 2395, 2398 (2008).
58. See 286 F. App'x 834, 839 (4th Cir. 2008) (per curiam).
59. 554 U.S. at -, 128 S. Ct. at 2398.
60. Id.
61. Id.
[Vol. 44:513
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT
Twenty-eight of those over forty sued KAPL, alleging disparate-
treatment and disparate-impact under the ADEA 2
The jury returned a verdict for the employees on their dispa-
rate-impact claim, but not on their disparate-treatment claim.13
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit af-
firmed, but the Supreme Court vacated and remanded for further
proceedings consistent with its decision in Smith v. City of Jack-
son,64 which it decided while KAPL's petition for certiorari was
pending.65 The Court in City of Jackson used a "reasonableness"
standard as opposed to a "business necessity" standard when ex-
amining factors other than age that the employer used in its deci-
sion making.66
On remand, the court of appeals found for KAPL because the
court applied the "business necessity" standard rather than the
"reasonableness" standard from City of Jackson, and because the
employees had not carried the burden of persuasion on the rea-
sonableness factor.67 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to re-
solve conflicting decisions regarding which party was to be as-
signed the burden of persuasion on the reasonableness factor
when using the "reasonable factors other than age" ("RFOA") de-
fense.68
The RFOA exception in the ADEA states: "'It shall not be un-
lawful for an employer ... to take any action otherwise prohi-
bited... where the differentiation is based on reasonable factors
other than age.' ' 69 The Court began by noting that it has previous-
ly characterized the RFOA exception as one of the ADEA's five af-
firmative defenses, and that the "'burden of proving justification
or exemption under a special exception to the prohibitions of a
statute generally rests on one who claims its benefits.' 70 Because
the RFOA exception legitimizes otherwise illegal conduct by re-
62. Id.
63. Id. at __, 128 S. Ct. at 2399.
64. 544 U.S. 228 (2005).
65. Meacham, 554 U.S. at __, 128 S. Ct. at 2399.
66. Id.; see City of Jackson, 544 U.S. at 243.
67. Meacham, 554 U.S. at __, 128 S. Ct. at 2399.
68. Id. at __ 128 S. Ct. at 2398, 2400.
69. Id. at __, 128 S. Ct. 2400 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (2006)).
70. Id. (quoting Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 44-45 (1948)).
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ference to an additional item of proof, it creates a defense obligat-
ing the one invoking it to bear the burden of proof.,'
The Court also noted that City of Jackson confirms that the
prohibition against age discrimination extends to disparate-
impact claims.72 Next, the Court explained that "[tihe RFOA de-
fense in a disparate-impact case ... is not focused on the asserted
fact that a non-age factor was at work; we assume it was. The fo-
cus of the defense is that the factor relied upon was a 'reasonable'
one for the employer to be using. ' 73 Significantly, reasonableness
is distinct and independent from the "because of age" condition.
Consequently, trial courts evaluating the RFOA defense going
forward will first assure that non-age factors were used, and then
require the employer to present credible evidence establishing
that the non-age factors on which it relied were reasonable.
Finally, the Court stated that a plaintiff cannot merely allege
disparate impact by claiming a "'generalized policy that leads to'
disparate impact; rather, the plaintiff must identify "'specific em-
ployment practices that are allegedly responsible for any ob-
served statistical disparities,"' which, the Court noted, is "not a
trivial burden."7 5 Although it essentially conceded that placing the
burden of persuasion on employers will make such claims more
difficult and costly to defend, the Court observed that such con-
cerns must be directed at Congress, because it wrote the RFOA
exception "in the orthodox format of an affirmative defense.
76
The Meacham decision is significant because it establishes that
an employer defending a disparate-impact claim on the basis of
"reasonable factors other than age" must not only produce evi-
dence raising the defense, but must also persuade the fact finder
of its merit.7 7 In so doing, Meacham eases the burden on plaintiffs
advancing disparate-impact claims, while making it more difficult
and costly for employers to assert the RFOA defense.
The news is not all bad for employers though, because in a 5-4
decision in June 2009, the Supreme Court made it more difficult
71. Id. at __ 128 S. Ct. at 2401.
72. Id. at __, 128 S. Ct. at 2403.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at __, 128 S. Ct. at 2405-06.
76. Id. at -, 128 S. Ct. at 2406.
77. Id. at __, 128 S. Ct. at 2398.
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for ADEA plaintiffs to establish that their employer discrimi-
nated on the basis of age by holding, in Gross v. FBL Financial
Services, Inc., that a mixed-motive jury instruction "is never prop-
er in an ADEA case."7 8 The basis for this decision is the view that
a plaintiffs burden of proof under the ADEA is more strict than
under Title VII, which allows employees to bring a discrimination
claim "in which an improper consideration was 'a motivating fac-
tor' for an adverse employment decision."79
Plaintiff Jack Gross, a fifty-four-year-old employee of FBL Fi-
nancial Services, sued for age discrimination when he was de-
moted from a managerial position and some of his job duties were
reallocated to a younger female employee. 80 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit overturned a $46,945 jury
verdict in Gross's favor, ruling that the jury had been improperly
instructed under the Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins (i.e., mixed-
motives) standard, as Gross admitted that he failed to present
any direct evidence of age discrimination.8' Presumably, the
Eighth Circuit would allow a mixed-motives instruction where
the evidence of age discrimination was direct rather than cir-
cumstantial. The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court
of appeals and remanded the case.8 2
The Supreme Court noted that the plain language of the ADEA
requires a plaintiff to "prove that age was the 'but-for' cause of
the employer's adverse decision."s' For that reason, the Court held
78. 557 U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2346 (2009).
79. Id. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 2349 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)). Unlike disparate
treatment claims, in mixed motives claims under Title VII, an employee seeks to prove
that an adverse employment action was motivated by both permissible and impermissible
(i.e., discriminatory) considerations, rather than proving that the discriminatory reason
was the factor behind the adverse employment action. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(2)(m)
(2006), with 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2006); see also Gross, 557 U.S. at -, 129 S. Ct. at
2349.
80. Gross, 557 U.S. at -, 129 S. Ct. at 2346-47.
81. See id. at_, 129 S. Ct. at 2347; Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228
(1989)). Price Waterhouse dealt with a mixed-motives Title VII case, holding that if a
'plaintiff shows that discrimination was a 'motivating' or a 'substantial' factor in the em-
ployer's [adverse] action," the burden of persuasion would then shift to the employer "to
show that it would have taken the same action regardless of that impermissible considera-
tion." Gross, 557 U.S. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 2347 (citing Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258).
82. Gross, 557 U.S. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 2352.
83. Id. at __ 129 S. Ct. at 2350. The ADEA states, "[i]t shall be unlawful for an em-
ployer ... to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's age." 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2006) (emphasis add-
ed)); see Gross, 557 U.S. at -, 129 S. Ct. at 2350.
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that the mixed-motives burden-shifting framework does not apply
in ADEA claims; therefore, it would never be proper to instruct
the jury that a plaintiff may establish age discrimination "by
showing that age was simply a motivating factor."8' Consequent-
ly, the responsibility rests with the employee to prove that age
was the motivating factor for the adverse employment action.
This case essentially widens the gap between Title VII and the
ADEA, and will make it significantly more difficult for employees
to succeed in prosecuting ADEA claims.
B. Title VII and the ADEA in the Fourth Circuit
In Ilozor v. Hampton University, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for
the employer in a suit alleging breach of contract and
discriminatory discharge under the ADEA and Title VII. 5
Benedict Ilozor, a former professor at Hampton University
("Hampton"), alleged that Hampton, Eric Sheppard, and Bradford
Grant failed to renew his contract due to his age and his national
origin.
8 6
Ilozor is Nigerian-born and a citizen of both Nigeria and
Australia.17 He was a tenured faculty member at Deakin
University in Sydney before Grant, the department chair selected
him for a non-tenure track position in Hampton's Architecture
Department.88 This position was a temporary annual position in
which Ilozor carried a nine-month contract with no guarantee of
reappointment.8 9 Ilozor was thirty-eight years old when he
accepted the position. 90
84. Gross, 557 U.S. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 2349 (emphasis added).
85. 286 F. App'x 834, 835 (4th Cir. 2008) (per curiam).
86. Id. at 835. Ilozor's breach of contract claim was premised on Grant's statement to
Ilozor in an e-mail prior to the start of Ilozor's employment that Grant was "not sure how
much [the university) can financially support [Ilozor's] move to Virginia and [Grant
thought] that it would not be more than a flight to Virginia." Id. The court held that
statement "plainly did not create an enforceable contract for the payment of all costs asso-
ciated with moving Ilozor and his family from Australia to Virginia." Id. at 841. Addition-
ally, the court noted the contract Ilozor signed with Hampton did not contain a provision
for the payment of moving expenses. Id. at 835-36. Therefore, the court affirmed summary
judgment on that claim. Id. at 841.
87. Id. at 835.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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In his first semester at Hampton, Ilozor was assigned to teach
a class with another professor, who complained to Grant
repeatedly that Ilozor did not respect her and gave conflicting
directions in class.9' Students in the class also complained that
Ilozor was "confusing" in class.92 The same result occurred the
following semester, when Ilozor taught another class with a
different professor with whom Ilozor had developed a friendly
relationship. 3 Both professors stated they would never teach with
Ilozor again. 94 Despite this professional dysfunction, Grant
recommended that Ilozor stay at Hampton for the coming year,
and Hampton renewed his annual contract. 95
Ilozor became upset when Grant did not offer him a tenure-
track position, and instead recommended Professor Shannon
Chance for that position. 96 Ilozor claimed that when he confronted
Grant about this decision, Grant responded, "'[Chance] is a good
American lady, she is younger than you are, she is free with no
distraction from kids, and has a great potential to grow.'"' 9 Ilozor
further claimed that at the start of the next academic year, Grant
made two offensive remarks to Ilozor.98 First, Grant commented
that "[no American pretends to be an African" and that Grant
had "no connection with Africa."99 Second, in response to Ilozor's
question to Grant about African architectural taxonomy, Grant
stated, "I am not an African. Go to an African."100
Due to the complaints by professors with whom Ilozor co-
taught in his first two semesters at Hampton, Grant assigned
Ilozor to teach a class by himself in the new academic year. 1'01 The
class was considered a failure, however, and staff, faculty, and
students continued to complain that Ilozor was condescending,
91. Id. at 836.
92. Id.
93. See id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. Professor Chance was the professor with whom Ilozor co-taught during his first
semester at Hampton. Id.
97. Id. Grant denied making this statement, but the court accepted Ilozor's version of
the facts as true, as is required in an appeal from an award of summary judgment for the
defendant. Id. n.5.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 837.
100. Id. Again, Grant denied making these statements, but the court accepted Ilozor's
version of the facts as true. Id. n.6.
101. Id. at 837.
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behaved inappropriately, and that the project he assigned his
class was too large and complex."2 In response to this negative
feedback, Grant wrote a memo recommending that Ilozor's
contract not be renewed. 103 Among other things, this memo
"referenced Ilozor's credentials as 'foreign based' and also
indicated that, '[coming from Nigeria via Australia and arriving
in the U.S. for the first time, Dr. Ilozor has had a very difficult
time, understanding and contributing to our mission and
direction."'104 Hampton selected a twenty-four-year-old candidate
who just completed graduate school to replace Ilozor.105 This
decision led Ilozor to allege that Hampton discriminated against
him on the basis of his national origin and age in violation of Title
VII and the ADEA.106
In reviewing the grant of summary judgment to Hampton de
novo, 1 7 the Fourth Circuit noted it "'review[s] professorial em-
ployment decisions with great trepidation,' remaining 'cognizant
of the fact that professorial appointments necessarily involve sub-
jective and scholarly judgments, with which we have been reluc-
tant to interfere.'108 Ultimately, the court determined that Ilozor
could not succeed in proving either of his discrimination claims.109
The central issue was whether Ilozor had been the victim of in-
tentional discrimination, and to be successful, Ilozor was required
to produce sufficient evidence "'that the protected trait[s] actually
motivated [Hampton's] decision' to not renew his contract. 10
The court decided that, contrary to Ilozor's assertions, Grant's
memo referencing Ilozor's "foreign based" credentials did not
"render the memo a revelation of animosity toward or stereotyp-
ing of persons with Ilozor's background.""'1 The court also rejected
Ilozor's allegation that Grant's statements regarding Ilozor's lack
of communication skills and complaints about Ilozor giving
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 838.
106. Id. at 835, 838.
107. Id. at 838.
108. Id. at 839 (quoting Jiminez v. Mary Washington College, 57 F.3d 369, 376 (4th
Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
109. Id. at 840.
110. Id. at 839 (quoting Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277,
286 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
111. Id. at 840.
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confusing directions in class "represent[ed] veiled references to
Ilozor's foreign accent."12 Further, Ilozor failed to demonstrate
how "Grant's comments that he did not personally consider
himself an African and.., that he believed no American should
pretend to be an African" established a "discriminatory animus"
toward African-born individuals.13
The court used the oft-cited Proud v. Stone "same hirer and
firer" analysis to buttress its decision.1 1 4 Since Grant was the
person who made both the decision to hire Ilozor and the decision
not to renew his contract, a "powerful inference" exists that
"discrimination did not motivate [Grant] ."5 Finally, the court de-
termined that even when viewing the evidence in Ilozor's favor,
Grant's comments that Chance received the tenure track position
"because she was a 'good American lady"' and was "'younger than
Ilozor,"' did not constitute evidence sufficient for a jury to con-
clude "that Hampton's decision not to renew Ilozor's contract was
based on his national origin and/or age, rather than the problems
with his performance and his difficulty working in Hampton's
collaborative environment."1 1 6
This result may be surprising to some at first blush, because
the evidence that Ilozor presented could establish pretext when
considered cumulatively, and when considered in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff. When analyzed more closely, however,
this decision makes plain that a discharged employee must have
evidence that rebuts the employer's proffered legitimate, non-
discriminatory reasons squarely. Otherwise, the evidence of
pretext will be regarded as stray, isolated comments that do not
evince any intention to discriminate. In this instance, although
Ilozor had a theory for his discharge and some support for this
theory, he was unable to convince the court that the employer's
proffered reasons for his discharge were inconsistent with his
evidence.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See id.; see also Proud v. Stone, 945 F.2d 796, 797 (4th Cir. 1991).
115. Ilozor, 286 F. App'x at 840 (quoting Proud, 945 F.2d at 797 ("[I]t hardly makes
sense to hire workers from a group one dislikes .. only to fire them once they are on the
job.")).
116. Id.
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IV. SEXUALLY HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT, RETALIATION,
AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT
A. Sexually Hostile Work Environment and Retaliation
In two decisions this past year, the Fourth Circuit expanded
protection for certain employees claiming hostile work environ-
ment and retaliation. First, Ziskie v. Mineta essentially lowered
the standard necessary to establish a hostile work environment
claim117 by establishing that plaintiffs advancing such claims can
present "me too" evidence (i.e., evidence of conduct or comments
not directed to them specifically).118 Second, in Caldwell v. John-
son, the court extended the lower burden reflected in Burlington
Northern & Sante Fe Railroad Co. v. White to federal em-
ployees. 119 Consequently, federal employees advancing retaliation
claims are required to demonstrate only that "a reasonable em-
ployee would have found the challenged action materially ad-
verse,"120 and are no longer required to demonstrate any adverse
employment action. 21
In Ziskie v. Mineta, a female air traffic controller brought suit
against her employer, alleging a sexually hostile work environ-
ment, and that her employer retaliated against her for complain-
ing of discrimination. 122 Ziskie had worked only part-time until
the Federal Aviation Administration discontinued all part-time
employment for air traffic controllers.23 To work around the eli-
mination of part-time employment, Ziskie began taking sick days
on the days she was previously allowed to stay home.124 Soon the-
reafter, Ziskie complained of profanity and other crude language,
sexist comments that were directed at other employees or to no
one in particular, preference given to male employees in making
their schedules, and hostile treatment by several male co-
workers.125
117. See 547 F.3d 220, 229-30 (4th Cir. 2008).
118. See id. at 225.
119. Caldwell v. Johnson, 289 F. App'x 579, 592 (4th Cir. 2008) (citing Burlington N. &
Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 67-68 (2006)).
120. Id. at 588 (quoting Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 67-68).
121, See id. at 588, 592.
122, Ziskie, 547 F.3d at 222.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 222-23.
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Ziskie began keeping a diary of the offensive comments she heard
in the office.126
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia granted summary judgment to the employer on the hos-
tile work environment claim because Ziskie could not prove the
treatment was severe or pervasive. 127 In so doing, the district
court refused to admit affidavits from female co-workers regard-
ing statements about which Ziskie had no personal knowledge. 128
The district court also granted summary judgment to the employ-
er on the retaliation claim, because Ziskie failed to show she suf-
fered any adverse employment action, or that there was a causal
connection between the protected activity and any adverse em-
ployment action. 129
The Fourth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the em-
ployer on the retaliation claim, but reversed on the hostile work
environment claim. 130 To establish a hostile work environment
claim, a plaintiff must show "'the offending conduct (1) was un-
welcome, (2) was based on her sex, (3) was sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter the conditions of her employment and create an
abusive work environment, and (4) was imputable to her employ-
er."' 13 In light of these elements, the Fourth Circuit disagreed
with the exclusion of the co-worker affidavits regarding conduct
not directly witnessed by Ziskie, especially for purposes of deter-
mining if the offending conduct was sufficiently severe or perva-
sive to alter the work environment. 132 The court held that evi-
dence of offensive conduct not directed at the plaintiff is relevant,
because it can show whether the working environment was hos-
tile, even if the plaintiff did not witness such behavior first-
hand. 133
Although it reversed the grant of summary judgment on the
hostile work environment claim, the court noted that Ziskie's
126. Id. at 222.
127. Id. at 224.
128. Id. at 225.
129. Id. at 224.
130. Id. at 229.
131. Id. at 224 (quoting Ocheltree v. Scollon Prods., Inc., 335 F.3d 325, 331 (4th Cir.
2003)).
132. Id. at 224-25.
133. Id. at 225.
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claim was weak.13 On remand, she would have to show a triable
issue as to whether her treatment was based on gender, and
whether the conduct was sufficiently severe and pervasive to al-
ter her work environment. 135 The court acknowledged the offen-
sive conduct could be the result of Ziskie's undisputed abuse of
sick leave and her penchant for recording all conceivably offen-
sive statements in a diary, rather than because of her gender.136
The court added that, although the environment was "coarse"
and "boorish," Ziskie would have trouble showing that her percep-
tion of the work environment was reasonable under the circums-
tances, especially considering that "Title VII is not 'a general ci-
vility code. 1 37 To succeed on remand, Ziskie must show that her
working environment reflected more than just "the kind of ten-
sions that accompany any stressful workplace environment."138
Following Ziskie, conduct that a plaintiff did not actually wit-
ness in the workplace and, therefore, did not contribute to the de-
cision to commence litigation, can support the underlying claim
and enable it to survive summary judgment. Obviously, the now-
permissible use of "me too" evidence in hostile work environment
cases, whether through affidavit or live testimony, might make it
more difficult for employers to obtain summary judgment.
In Caldwell v. Johnson, a scientist working for the Environ-
mental Protection Agency ("EPA") brought suit alleging a hostile
work environment and retaliation. 13 9 Dr. Jane Caldwell claimed
that while working in the Hazardous Pollutant Assessment
Group at the EPA, male co-workers circulated pornographic pic-
tures, made lewd jokes, and claimed they were having an affair
with Dr. Caldwell.140 She also claimed one of her male supervisors
would stand uncomfortably close to her, once raising his leg on a
chair near her face while wearing particularly short shorts."4 Fi-
nally, she claimed other male supervisors were openly hostile to
134. Id. at 226.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 228 (citation omitted).
138. Id.
139. 289 F. App'x 579, 581, 584 (4th Cir. 2008).
140. Id. at 581-82.
141. Id. at 581.
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female employees generally 14 and that she was told she would not
be promoted if she continued to speak up at branch meetings. 143
Dr. Caldwell eventually contacted an Equal Employment Op-
portunity ("EEO") counselor regarding the "disparate treatment
and harassment" she attributed to her gender. 1 After that meet-
ing, several supervisors were transferred to other departments,
where they had no contact with Dr. Caldwell. 145 Nevertheless, Dr.
Caldwell felt she was subjected to retaliation for meeting with the
EEO counselor, claiming her supervisors impeded her promotion
by "delay[ing] the approval and processing of her promotion
package."146 Dr. Caldwell further claimed that someone tampered
with her computer and smashed her taillight. 147
The District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina
granted summary judgment for the EPA on all counts.'" The
Fourth Circuit upheld summary judgment on the claims for su-
pervisor-related hostile work environment and co-worker-related
hostile work environment,' but reversed the grant of summary
judgment on the retaliation claim.150 A major point of disagree-
ment between the Fourth Circuit and the lower court was wheth-
er Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White ap-
142. Id. at 582.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 583.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 584.
149. Id. at 586. An employer faces strict liability on a supervisor-created hostile work
environment claim if the employer takes "tangible employment action," which includes
"discharge, demotion, or undesirable reassignment." Id. at 585 (citation omitted). If the
employee fails to prove there was a "tangible employment action," the employer is entitled
to an affirmative defense if it can prove: "(a) that the employer exercised reasonable care
to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff
employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventative or corrective oppor-
tunities" that they provided. Id. The court found Dr. Caldwell failed to show a "tangible
employment action" because the court did not believe a mere delay in promotion based on
conjecture or a change in buildings was sufficient. Id. In addition, the EPA took sufficient
preventative measures when it processed Dr. Caldwell's EEO claim and transferred her
supervisor. Id. at 586. Dr. Caldwell's claim for co-worker-created hostile work environ-
ment also failed because Dr. Caldwell could not show that the EPA was negligent in fail-
ing to take action after receiving knowledge of the conduct. See id. at 587. The EPA took
prompt and adequate action by holding branch meetings and sending e-mails to discuss
the problems. Id.
150. Id. at 592.
2009]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
plied. 151 The lower court believed Burlington Northern only ap-
plied to cases of private sector employment.' The Fourth Circuit
held, however, that Burlington Northern also applied to public
sector employees. 153 "[L]imited construction" of the Burlington
Northern decision "would fail to fully achieve the anti-retaliation
provision's 'primary purpose,' namely '[mlaintaining unfettered
access to statutory remedial mechanisms. 1" 54 In applying the
"materially adverse" test of Burlington Northern to the present
case, the court determined Dr. Caldwell would have to show the
following to establish a prima facie case of retaliation: "(1) that
she engaged in protected activity, (2) that her employer took ma-
terially adverse action against her, such that it could dissuade a
reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of dis-
crimination, . . .and (3) that a causal relationship existed be-
tween the protected activity and the materially adverse activi-
ty." 5 The Fourth Circuit remanded the case to the district court
to decide what effect this test would have on the outcome. 56
The Caldwell decision lowers the burden for public sector
plaintiffs alleging retaliation because it extends the lower stan-
dard for private sector plaintiffs articulated in Burlington North-
ern to federal employees. Now, to establish retaliation, a public
sector employee does not have to show any adverse employment
action; rather, he or she must show only that a reasonable em-
ployee would have found the challenged action "materially ad-
verse."157 Significantly, a reasonable employee may find a chal-
lenged action "materially adverse" if he or she might have been
"'dissuaded... from making or supporting a charge of discrimina-
tion."' 58 Although materially adverse actions will often be adverse
employment actions, public sector employees can now prosecute a
retaliation claim in the absence of an adverse employment action.
151. See id. at 587, 592.
152. See id. at 587.
153. Id. at 592.
154. Id. at 591 (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 64
(2006)).
155. Id. at 592 (citing Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 67-68) (emphasis added).
156. See id.
157. Id. at 588 (citing Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 60, 67-68).
158. Id. (quoting Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 68).
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B. Sexual Harassment
In a case involving alleged sexual harassment of a student by
an employee at Virginia Tech, the Supreme Court of Virginia em-
phasized the weight of an administrative hearing officer's find-
ings. 159 Aside from its bearing on factually analogous sexual ha-
rassment claims, this decision highlights the need to identify the
specific law a hearing officer has contradicted when appealing his
or her decision. 160
In Virginia Polytechnic Institute v. Quesenberry, the Supreme
Court of Virginia reversed the Court of Appeals of Virginia, find-
ing that the administrative hearing officer's decision was not con-
tradictory to law. 6 ' Although a grievant must show how a deci-
sion is contrary to law in order to appeal from an administrative
hearing, 162 the grievant in Quesenberry failed to even allege how
the decision was contradictory to a specific law. 63
Quesenberry was employed by Virginia Tech as a business
manager in the Communications Network Services Depart-
ment.'6 In April 2005, he received a "Group II" written discipli-
nary notice for looking at pornographic material on a University
computer, and received a four-day suspension. 65
In 2006, Quesenberry was issued a "Group III" written discip-
linary notice and was permanently terminated.166 A female stu-
dent claimed she felt uncomfortable when having a discussion
with Quesenberry about a calendar he planned on producing for a
non-University-affiliated boxing club. 167 Quesenberry and another
University employee discussed the calendar with the twenty-
year-old female student who worked for a student-run organiza-
159. See Va. Polytech. Inst. & State Univ. v. Quesenberry, 277 Va. 420, 429, 674 S.E.2d
854, 858 (2009).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 431, 674 S.E.2d at 859.
162. Id. at 429, 674 S.E.2d at 858; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3006(B) (Repl. Vol.
2008 & Supp. 2009).
163. 277 Va. at 429, 674 S.E.2d at 858.
164. Id. at 423, 674 S.E.2d at 855.
165. Id. at 423-24, 674 S.E.2d at 855.
166. Id. at 424, 674 S.E.2d at 855.
167. Id. at 424-25, 674 S.E.2d at 856. Quesenberry voluntarily coached a boxing club
for disadvantaged youth. Id. at 424, 674 S.E.2d at 855. In order to raise money, the club
planned on producing a calendar with pictures of scantily clad women in boxing scenarios.
Id., 674 S.E.2d at 855-56.
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tion in the same building as the men's offices, telling her they
needed models to pose for pictures wearing "short shorts" or bath-
ing suits, and that the pictures would be "tastefully done.168 The
student reported that she felt uncomfortable during the meeting,
began locking her office door, and started taking a less direct
route to work to avoid contact with either man.169
The administrative hearing officer concluded that Quesenberry
failed to comply with a portion of the University's Anti-
Discrimination and Harassment Policy, but reduced the infrac-
tion from "Group III" to "Group II," finding Quesenberry did not
intentionally engage in inappropriate behavior. 170 The hearing of-
ficer upheld the termination, however, because Quesenberry had
amassed two "Group II" infractions within three years. 7' Finally,
the hearing officer decided Quesenberry's actions did not rise to
the level of sexual harassment because his conduct was not se-
vere or pervasive. 72
The standard of review in Virginia Code section 2.2-3006(B)
holds that a grievant may only appeal a decision from an admin-
istrative hearing officer when it is "contradictory to law."' 73 The
circuit court determined the hearing officer's finding was "con-
trary to law," and ordered Quesenberry's reinstatement and com-
pensation for lost wages. 74 The circuit court also noted Quesen-
berry's conduct did not rise to the level of sexual harassment.15
The court of appeals upheld the circuit court's decision, reviewing
the case under a sexual harassment analysis based on Title VII
case law. 76
The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed on grounds that Que-
senberry failed to allege how the hearing officer's decision was
contrary to any specific law. 77 The court believed the analysis of
Quesenberry's case under Title VII was inappropriate, as the
168. Id., 674 S.E.2d at 856.
169. Id. at 424-25, 674 S.E.2d at 856.
170. Id. at 425-26, 674 S.E.2d at 856.
171. Id. at 426, 674 S.E.2d at 856.
172. Id. at 425, 674 S.E.2d at 856.
173. Id. at 429, 674 S.E.2d at 858 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3006(B) (Repl. Vol.
2008)).
174. Id. at 426, 674 S.E.2d at 856.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 426-27, 674 S.E.2d at 857.
177. Id. at 429, 431, 674 S.E.2d at 858-59.
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hearing officer stated explicitly that Quesenberry had not com-
mitted sexual harassment.1 78
This decision reiterates the significant weight accorded to the
findings of an administrative hearing officer, which are disturbed
on appeal only if they are contradictory to law. 179 Indeed, a party
appealing the decision of any administrative hearing officer must
identify the law contradicted with precision in its petition for ap-
peal. 80 As Quesenberry demonstrates, an appellant's failure in
this regard can cause the appeal to fail from its inception. Thus,
although the standard of review remains unchanged, the Su-
preme Court of Virginia essentially admonished the circuit court
and court of appeals for engaging in a substantive review of the
administrative hearing officer's findings in the absence of the ap-
pellant's recitation of the law(s) purportedly nullified during the
administrative hearing.
V. ARBITRATION
Earlier this year, the United States Supreme Court resolved
whether a labor union can choose mandatory arbitration through
collective bargaining on behalf of its members. Prior to 14 Penn
Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 181 there was considerable confusion regarding
how Gilmer v. Interstate /Johnson Lane Corp., which held that an
employee may individually agree to compulsory arbitration, 182
could be reconciled with Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., which
held that a collective bargaining agreement could not waive cov-
ered workers' rights to bring suit in the courts for federal causes
of action. 183
In 14 Penn Plaza, the Court held that "a collective-bargaining
agreement that clearly and unmistakably requires union mem-
bers to arbitrate" claims brought under the ADEA "is enforceable
as a matter of federal law."'8
178. Id. at 429-30, 674 S.E.2d at 858-59.
179. See id. at 429, 674 S.E.2d at 858.
180. See id.
181. See 556 U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009).
182. 500 U.S. 20, 33-35 (1991).
183. 415 U.S. 36, 49-51 (1974).
184. 556 U.S. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 1474.
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Respondents were union members and worked as night lobby
watchmen and in other similar capacities in 14 Penn Plaza LLC's
New York City office building.'85 The parties signed a collective
bargaining agreement ("CBA"), negotiated in good faith by the
union's Realty Advisory Board on Labor Relations, Inc. 8 6 Under
the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), the union is the res-
pondents' exclusive bargaining representative, and the union has
exclusive authority to bargain on behalf of the respondents with
regard to their "'rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or oth-
er conditions of employment."1 7
In August 2003, 14 Penn Plaza, with the union's consent, hired
a unionized security contractor to provide licensed security
guards for the building.'88 Therefore, the respondents were reas-
signed to jobs as porters and cleaners.189 The respondents were
distraught, claiming their reassignments "led to a loss in income,
caused them emotional distress, and were otherwise less desira-
ble than their former positions," and they asked the union to file
grievances alleging, among other things, that 14 Penn Plaza "vi-
olated the CBA's ban on workplace discrimination by reassigning
respondents on account of their age" in violation of the ADEA. 19°
The union, however, withdrew the age discrimination claims,
believing there was no legitimate objection to the reassignments,
since the union consented to the contract for the new security
personnel.9' The respondents received right-to-sue notices from
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and brought
suit against 14 Penn Plaza.' 92 The CBA signed by the parties,
however, required union members to submit all claims of em-
ployment discrimination to binding arbitration under the CBA's
grievance and dispute resolution procedures. 193 Accordingly, 14
Penn Plaza filed a motion to compel arbitration of the age dis-
crimination claims.114 The district court denied the motion, and
185. Id. at -, 129 S. Ct. at 1461.
186. Id. The RAB is a multi-employer bargaining association of which 14 Penn Plaza is
a member. Id.
187. Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2006)).
188. Id. at __, 129 S. Ct. 1462.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. See id. at __ 129 S. Ct. at 1464.
194. Id. at -, 129 S. Ct. at 1462.
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the Second Circuit affirmed, holding that provisions in CBAs re-
quiring arbitration of ADEA claims are not enforceable. 195
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed on grounds
that the parties "collectively bargained in good faith and agreed
that employment-related discrimination claims," including ADEA
claims, would be resolved through arbitration.196 "As in any con-
tractual negotiation, a union may agree to the inclusion of an ar-
bitration provision in a collective-bargaining agreement in return
for other concessions from the employer," and "[c]ourts generally
may not interfere in this bargained-for exchange.' 97
The NLRA requires mandatory bargaining with regard to con-
ditions of employment, and the Court found the freely negotiated
contractual term concerning arbitration of employment discrimi-
nation claims qualified as a condition of employment.198 In addi-
tion, the Court felt the arbitration provision unambiguously re-
quired the respondents to arbitrate their age-discrimination
claims.199 Because the Court found the ADEA did not remove age-
discrimination grievances from the NLRA's broad sweep, it held
that the arbitration provision should be enforced.200
The 14 Penn Plaza decision is significant because it reconciled
the Gardner-Denver and Gilmer decisions and eliminated linger-
ing confusion. In Gardner-Denver, the Court held that a collective
bargaining agreement could not waive covered workers' rights to
a judicial forum for congressionally created causes of action.20 1 In
Gilmer, on the other hand, the Court held that an employee who
had individually agreed to waive his right to a federal forum
could be compelled to arbitrate a federal age-discrimination
claim.202 In 14 Penn Plaza, the Second Circuit held that while an
individual can freely choose compulsory arbitration, a labor union
cannot collectively bargain for arbitration on behalf of its mem-
bers. 203
195. Id. at -, 129 S. Ct. at 1462-63.
196. Id. at -, 129 S. Ct. at 1464.
197. Id.
198. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2006)).
199. Id. at -, 129 S. Ct. at 1466.
200. Id.
201. 415 U.S. 36, 49-51 (1974).
202. 500 U.S. 20, 33-35 (1991).
203. Pyett v. Pa. Bldg. Co., 498 F.3d 88, 93-94 (2d Cir. 2007).
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The Supreme Court, however, stated clearly that Gilmer ap-
plies to collective-bargaining situations, noting that "[n]othing in
the law suggests a distinction between the status of arbitration
agreements signed by an individual employee and those agreed to
by a union representative."20 4 The Court added that 14 Penn Plaza
does not contradict Gardner-Denver, as Gardner-Denver "'did not
involve the issue of the enforceability of an agreement to arbi-
trate statutory claims.'205 Instead, Gardner-Denver "involved the
quite different issue [of] whether arbitration of contract-based
claims precluded subsequent judicial resolution of statutory
claims. °206 The arbitration provision at issue in 14 Penn Plaza ex-
pressly covered both statutory and contractual discrimination
claims.207
Of course, arbitration of ADEA claims "does not waive the sta-
tutory right to be free from workplace age discrimination. ''2°s Arbi-
tration of ADEA claims only waives the right to seek relief from a
court in the first instance.20 9 The Court noted that any concern
that a union may subordinate an individual employee's interests
to the collective interests of all employees in the union is not an
appropriate justification for reading a qualification into the
ADEA that does not actually exist.210 Predictably, the Court rea-
soned that Congress, not the judiciary, should amend the ADEA
to address the conflict-of-interest concern identified in the Gard-
ner-Denver line of cases. 211
VI. RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS
Though it is regarded as an employer-friendly state recognizing
only a very narrow exception to the employment-at-will doctrine,
Virginia has long disfavored covenants not to compete. 212 The
Fairfax County Circuit Court bolstered this position in Strategic
204. 14 Penn Plaza, 556 U.S. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 1465.
205. Id. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 1468 (quoting Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35).
206. Id.
207. Id. at __ 129 S. Ct. at 1469.
208. Id. In clarifying that arbitration does not waive such statutory rights, the Court
shed light on dicta in the Gardner-Denver line of cases concerning the use of arbitration to
assert statutory antidiscrimination rights. See id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at__, 129 S. Ct. at 1472.
211. Id.
212. See Modern Env'ts, Inc. v. Stinnett, 263 Va. 491, 493, 561 S.E.2d 694, 695 (2002).
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Enterprise Solutions, Inc. v. Ikuma, finding the non-competition,
non-solicitation, and no-contact clauses at issue overbroad and
unenforceable. 1
Defendant Akira Ikuma was an employee for Plaintiff Strategic
Enterprise Solutions ("SE Solutions"), which provides consulting
services to government and private sector clients, including the
Department of Homeland Security ("DHS").2 14 On January 2,
2008, following almost eighteen months of employment, Ikuma
informed SE Solutions of his intent to resign to work for Booz
Allen Hamilton ("BAH"), which also provided services to DHS.215
In May of 2008, "Ikuma began contacting employees of SE
Solutions who were providing services to DHS," informing the
employees of job opportunities at BAH. 216 In response, SE
Solutions initiated a lawsuit seeking, among other things, a
declaratory judgment that the non-competition, non-solicitation,
and no-contact clauses in the employment agreement
("Agreement") Ikuma signed were enforceable. 217 SE Solutions
also sought temporary and permanent injunctions against
Ikuma.218 Ikuma demurred to all causes of action. 19
The court began its analysis by reiterating the familiar
standards governing the enforceability of non-competition
agreements in Virginia. 220 Restrictive covenants "are not favored
in Virginia" and must be evaluated from the perspective of the
employer, the employee, and public policy.221 The restraint in the
covenant must be "no greater than necessary to protect the
employer in some legitimate business interest," not "unduly
harsh and oppressive in curtailing [the employee's] legitimate
efforts to earn a livelihood," and must not be against "sound
public policy."222 The court identified three factors Virginia courts
use to assess the reasonableness of restrictive covenants: "(1) the
duration of the restraint; (2) the geographic scope of the restraint;
213. No. 2008-8153, 2008 Va. Cir. LEXIS 144, at *7-12 (Cir. Ct. Oct. 7, 2008) (Fairfax
County).
214. Id. at *1-2.
215. Id. at *2.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. at *3.
220. See id. at *4-5.
221. See id.
222. Id. at *5.
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and (3) the scope and extent of the activity being restricted."223
Typically, such restrictive covenants are overbroad if they
prohibit an employee from working for a competitor in any
capacity.22 4
The Agreement between Ikuma and SE Solutions contained
three paragraphs constituting restrictions on competition.2 25 The
first paragraph was a non-compete clause prohibiting the
departing employee from "actively engag[ing] (whether as an em-
ployee, individual, proprietorship, partner, stockholder, associate,
or consultant) in any business in competition with Employer, as
Employer's business is constituted within one year preceding the
date of termination, expiration, and/or nonrenewal of this Agree-
ment."226 The court found the scope of the restriction to be unrea-
sonable because the clause was completely "devoid of any qualify-
ing language regarding the employee's position with the employer
or with the competitor," thereby effectively prohibiting Ikuma
from working for a competing business in any capacity. 227 The
language of the non-compete paragraph was also unreasonable
because it required an employee to know the entire scope of the
employer's business to determine the universe of competitors. 228
The second paragraph was a non-solicitation clause prohibiting
the departing employee from "voluntarily or involuntarily, direct-
ly or indirectly, solicit[ing], call[ing] upon or otherwise communi-
cat[ing] with any customers of Employer for which Employer per-
formed services or sold product[s]."229 The appropriate inquiry for
assessing non-solicitation covenants is "whether or not the em-
ployer is protecting a legitimate business interest and whether or
not this protection is overly burdensome on the employee."230 The
223. Id. (citing Simmons v. Miller, 261 Va. 561, 581, 544 S.E.2d 666, 678 (2001)).
224. Id. at *5-6 (citing Motion Control Sys., Inc. v. East, 262 Va. 33, 37-38, 546 S.E.2d
424, 426 (2001)); see id. at *6-7 (citing Omniplex World Servs. Corp. v. US Investigations
Servs., 270 Va. 246, 249-50, 618 S.E.2d 340, 342 (2005); Modern Env'ts v. Stinnett, 263
Va. 491, 493-94, 561 S.E.2d 694, 695 (2002)).
225. Id. at *4.
226. Id. at *7.
227. Id. at *7-8. The court used the ever-present "janitor" example in its rationale:
"Under this Agreement, Mr. Ikuma could not be employed by BAH as a janitor, solely be-
cause BAH is a competitor of SE Solutions." Id. at *8.
228. Id. at *8.
229. Id. at *9-10.
230. Id. at *8-9. The test for reasonableness of non-solicitation clauses is the same as
that for non-compete clauses. Id. at *8 (citing Foti v. Cook, 220 Va. 800, 805, 263 S.E.2d
430, 433 (1980)).
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court held the language of the non-solicitation clause-
particularly the phrase "or otherwise communicate with"-was
not narrowly tailored, because it plainly prohibited Ikuma from
communicating in any way with any customers of SE Solutions. 23'
For that reason, the clause was overly broad and unenforceable. 23 2
Finally, the court considered the no-contact clause in Ikuma's
Agreement (i.e., a provision prohibiting solicitation of current SE
Solutions employees), the relevant parts of which read:
[D]uring the term of employment and for two years after the date of
termination, expiration, and/or nonrenewal of this Agreement, Em-
ployee will not in any way, directly or indirectly... hire or engage
any employee of Employer or any former employee of Employer
whose employment with Employer ceased less than two (2) years be-
fore the date of such hiring or engagement.
23
The court held that because this language "in no way limits its
reach to keeping employees from competing directly with SE
Solutions," as required under Virginia law, it was overbroad and
unenforceable.234
In its opinion, the court also noted that Virginia does not allow
"blue penciling" of contracts. 235 While the Supreme Court of
Virginia has not expressly rejected reformation in the context of
overly broad portions of restrictive covenants, "it is clear from the
restrictive covenant jurisprudence in Virginia that the Court does
not entertain the notion that these disfavored restraints on trade
should be reformed by the judiciary, rather they construe them
against the employer when any ambiguity arises."236 Moreover,
231. Id. at *10 ("[if Mr. Ikuma saw a former DHS co-worker at the grocery store, and
the former co-worker spoke to him casually, asking about his family, Mr. Ikuma would be
prohibited from speaking to him under this clause.").
232. Id. at *10; see Blue Ridge Anesthesia & Critical Care, Inc. v. Gidick, 239 Va. 369,
373, 389 S.E.2d 467, 469-70 (1990) (upholding a restrictive covenant because it was nar-
rowly tailored to cover only those services actually rendered by the former employee to
specific customers of the employer).
233. Id. at *10-12.
234. Id. at *11-12, 15. By way of analogy, the court reasoned that under this para-
graph, even though Employees A and B had never worked at SE Solutions at the same
time and had never met one another, Employee A could not hire Employee B at a pizza
parlor that Employee A opened after her employment with SE Solutions ended. Id. at *11-
12.
235. Id. at *12-13. In other words, unlike many jurisdictions, Virginia courts will not
re-write an overbroad or otherwise unenforceable restriction in a contract in order to make
it reasonable where it is clear from the terms of the agreement that the provision is sever-
able. Id.
236. Id. at *12-13 (citing Modern Env'ts, Inc. v. Stinnett, 263 Va. 491, 493-94, 561
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circuit courts throughout Virginia "have refused to 'blue pencil'
non-compete clauses."237
Because the three paragraphs in Ikuma's Agreement were
overbroad and did not contain enforceable restrictions on
competition, and because it does not blue pencil, the court found
these provisions unenforceable as a matter of law. 238 This decision
signals that restrictive covenants such as these will be enforced
only when they provide clear guidance to the departing employee
as to what is and is not permitted, and are as narrowly tailored
as possible to address an employer's legitimate, protectable
interest. To the extent the restrictive covenants are vague, broad,
or punitive in nature, they will be struck in favor of the departing
employee's ability to earn a living.
In addition to addressing enforceability, Virginia courts have
ruled recently on issues such as choice of law and proper
execution of restrictive covenants. In Senture, LLC v. Dietrich,
the Eastern District of Virginia analyzed whether Kentucky law
should govern a restrictive covenant pursuant to a forum
selection clause in an employment agreement.2 9
The two defendants, Joseph Dietrich and Thomas Swider, were
employees of Senture, LLC, a Kentucky-based company that
provides support for national security programs. 240 When Dietrich
and Swider left Senture, they went to work for SAIC Inc., a
competitor. 241 Senture argued that Dietrich and Swider disclosed
confidential information to SAIC, resulting in a decrease in
business for Senture and "newfound success" for SAIC.24 2 Senture
filed suit against Dietrich and Swider alleging, among other
things, that they breached the covenant not to compete and the
confidentiality provisions of their employment agreements. 243
Dietrich and Swider argued that although their employment
agreements stated that Kentucky law would govern, the court
S.E.2d 694, 695 (2002)).
237. Id. at *13 (citing Pais v. Automation Prods., Inc., 36 Va. Cir. 230, 239 (Cir. Ct.
1995) (Newport News City).
238. See id. at *15.
239. 575 F. Supp. 2d 724, 726 (E.D. Va. 2008).
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. See id.
243. Id.
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should apply Virginia law to determine the validity of the
restrictive covenants.244
Dietrich and Swider argued for Virginia law on grounds that
the employment agreement was an "adhesion contract," and
because Kentucky law conflicts with Virginia public policy.245 The
court rejected those arguments and applied Kentucky law. 246 In so
doing, the court summarized its position on forum selection
clauses: they are "prima facie valid," and "absent a showing that
the provisions of the clause 'are unfair or unreasonable, or are
affected by fraud or unequal bargaining power,'... or that the
parties did not clearly intend for the designated law to govern the
terms of the contract," the court will honor the parties'
selection.2 41
Because (1) there was no evidence that Senture "did not clearly
intend for Kentucky law to apply;" (2) Dietrich and Swider did not
argue that the choice of Kentucky law was unreasonable; and (3)
Dietrich and Swider did not argue that Senture's "purpose in
choosing Kentucky law was in any way illegal or fraudulent,"
Virginia choice of law rules dictated that Kentucky law would
apply unless it was contrary to Virginia public policy.241 Dietrich
and Swider, however, failed to cite any public policy in Virginia
prohibiting the court from using Kentucky law to determine the
validity of the restrictive covenants in their employment
agreements. 249 Applying Kentucky law, the court found that the
non-compete clause was not overly broad in its temporal scope of
one year or in geographic scope-even though the restricted area
encompassed the entire United States.2 50
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. See id. at 727.
247. Id. (quoting Paul Bus. Sys., Inc. v. Canon U.S.A., Inc., 240 Va. 337, 342, 397
S.E.2d 804, 807 (1990); citing Black v. Powers, 48 Va. App. 113, 130, 628 S.E.2d 546, 555
(Ct. App. 2006)).
248. Id. The court rejected Dietrich and Snider's argument that employment contracts
are always "adhesion contracts" (that is, a "standard form contract, prepared by one party
and presented to a weaker party") and are inherently unfair. Id. at 727 n.1. According to
the court, this argument was wholly without merit because, where "an employee has the
freedom to consider employment elsewhere and is not bound to continue working for his
current employer, an employment agreement will not be considered an adhesion contract."
Id.
249. Id. at 727.
250. Id. at 728.
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In Workflow Solutions v. Lewis, the Norfolk Circuit Court
established that, although the intent of the parties to be bound by
restrictive covenants might be clear, proper execution of
restrictive covenants is essential. 25' Defendant Mike Lewis
resigned from his employment at Workflow Solutions, LLC
("Workflow") in December 2003 due to threatened litigation by
Workflow over alleged violations of restrictive covenants. 252
Subsequently, the parties signed an agreement stating:
[Mr. Lewis] shall be employed by [Workflow] ... on an "at will" basis
for a six-month "trial period," after which the parties may continue if
that is the mutual desire of [Workflow] and [Mr. Lewis]: if
employment continues, [Mr. Lewis] shall execute a new employment
agreement continuing [the] restrictive covenants in the form attached
as Exhibit A.25
Exhibit A was the employment agreement Lewis signed prior to
his resignation, which contained restrictive covenants, including
a "non-solicitation of customers" provision.25 4
Lewis worked for Workflow from the date of the agreement
through July 18, 2008-over four years.255 During that time,
Workflow never presented Lewis with a new employment
agreement containing the restrictive covenants as indicated in
the March 2004 agreement. 256 Despite this fact, Workflow sought
an order from the court that would (1) force Lewis to sign an
agreement containing the restrictive covenants and (2) enjoin
Lewis from competing with Workflow or disclosing its confidential
information.2 - 7
Workflow argued that even though it did not present (and
Lewis did not sign) a new employment agreement containing
restrictive covenants, Lewis was bound by the original restrictive
covenants since he worked for longer than the six-month trial
period.25 After underscoring Virginia's reluctance to enforce
251. See No. CL08-4634, 2008 Va. Cir. LEXIS 186, at *8-9 (Cir. Ct. Dec. 12, 2008) (Nor-
folk City).
252. Id. at *1.
253. Id. at *1-2 (emphasis added).
254. Id. at *2.
255. Id. at *2-3.
256. Id. at *3.
257. Id.
258. Id. at *3-4.
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restrictive covenants, 259 the court held that "it cannot create or
enforce a new agreement that was never presented to Lewis and
that he did not sign, even though he benefited from working at
Workflow." 260 Especially considering that restrictive covenants are
not favored in Virginia, the court refused to "re-write the parties'
settlement agreement to create new restrictive covenants because
the covenants ... must be strictly construed."26' Thus, although
the parties agreed in writing to execute and be bound by
restrictive covenants at a discrete point in time, and the assent of
the departing employee to some restrictions following four years
of employment was clear, the court was unwilling to impose a
prior version of restrictions based on the parties' failure to
execute a new contract with new restrictions.
VII. DEFAMATION
In early 2009, the Supreme Court of Virginia made summary
judgment more difficult for those defending defamation claims.
Specifically, a defendant can no longer obtain summary judgment
by establishing the truth of the allegedly defamatory statements
based on the plaintiffs own admissions regarding the truth of the
statements. 262 Summary judgment is only appropriate if a plain-
tiff admits the truth of the statements, as well as all "fair infe-
rences, implications, and insinuations that can be drawn from"
the statements .262
In Hyland v. Raytheon Technical Services Co., the Supreme
Court of Virginia held that "the factual portions of an allegedly
defamatory statement may not be evaluated for truth or falsity in
isolation, but must be considered in view of any accompanying
opinion and other stated facts."2 ' The plaintiff in Hyland brought
259. See id. at *6-9 (citing Persinger & Co. v. Larrowe, 252 Va. 404, 405, 477 S.E.2d
506, 507 (1996) (holding that the defendant was not bound by a non-compete clause in an
agreement that he never signed, even though he served as a partner and held a partner-
ship interest for several months); Profl Heating & Cooling, Inc. v. Smith, 64 Va. Cir. 313,
313-14 (Cir. Ct. 2004) (Norfolk City) (sustaining defendant's demurrer because defendant
had not signed a second "No Piracy Agreement" after he returned to work for his employer
for a second time)).
260. Id. at *9.
261. Id. at *9-10.
262. See Hyland v. Raytheon Technical Servs. Co. (Hyland II), 277 Va. 40, 48, 670
S.E.2d 746, 751 (2009).
263. Id.
264. Id.
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a defamation claim against her former employer, Raytheon Tech-
nical Services Company ("Raytheon"), and its president for five
statements made by him concerning the plaintiffs job perfor-
mance.265 The plaintiff worked for Raytheon for twenty-one years,
and was a senior vice president and general manager of a particu-
lar division at the time of her termination.266
In 2000, despite her division having lost a bid for a large gov-
ernment contract, the plaintiff received a positive performance
evaluation from the president.27 Then, in 2002, even though her
division lost another large government contract bid, the president
promoted the plaintiff as part of a reorganization. 26 Sometime af-
ter 2002, however, the president learned of some negative com-
ments the plaintiff made about him to an outside consulting firm
hired by Raytheon to assess the job performance of executive-
level employees.269 When it came time for the plaintiffs next per-
formance assessment, the president gave her the first negative
evaluation she ever received with the company, and eventually
terminated her employment.27 °
The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, awarding her
$1,850,000.271 On the first appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia
held that only two of the five statements submitted to the jury
were actionable for defamation. 27 2 Because the court could not de-
termine which of the five originally submitted statements served
as the basis for the jury's award, the court ordered a new trial li-
mited to consideration of the two actionable statements. 273
265. Id. at 42-43, 670 S.E.2d at 748.
266. Id. at 42, 670 S.E.2d at 748.
267. Id. at 43, 670 S.E.2d at 748.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id. (citing Raytheon Technical Servs. Co. v. Hyland (Hyland I), 273 Va. 292, 296,
641 S.E.2d 84, 86 (2007)).
273. Hyland 1, 273 Va. at 306, 641 S.E.2d at 92. The first actionable statement was the
president's statement that, "Cynthia lead [sic] [Raytheon] in the protest of the FAA's eval-
uation selection process for the TSSC contract and through a difficult procurement for the
TSA, both of which demanded her constant attention. These visible losses created signifi-
cant gaps in our strategic plans and in her business unit financial performance." Id. at
304, 641 S.E.2d at 91. The president's second actionable statement was, "Cynthia and her
team met their cash goals, but were significantly off plan on all other financial targets in-
cluding Bookings by 25%, Sales by 11.5%, and profit by 24%." Id. The court found that
both of these statements were actionable because they were subject to empirical proof and
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On remand, the circuit court granted Raytheon's motion for
summary judgment, finding that the plaintiffs own admissions or
concessions regarding the truth of the two allegedly defamatory
statements proved they were true as a matter of law.21 4 The plain-
tiff appealed on the grounds that the court failed to consider each
allegedly defamatory statement as a whole, which removed from
consideration any inferences or implications arising from each
statement in its entirety.275 The Supreme Court of Virginia agreed
with the plaintiff and remanded the case again.26
On the second appeal, the court stated that although state-
ments of opinion are not actionable as defamation, factual state-
ments made in support of an opinion, or statements made by infe-
rence, implication, or insinuation, can form the basis of a
defamation claim. 277 For this reason, neither a court nor a jury
may "isolate one portion of the statement at issue from another
portion," but instead "must consider the statement as a whole." 278
The court noted that it is the role of judges to determine, as a
matter of law, whether an allegedly defamatory statement con-
tains provably false factual statements or is merely a statement
of opinion. 279 Following this initial determination, it is ordinarily
for the jury to resolve whether the plaintiff has, in fact, proven
were not mere opinions. Id. at 304-05, 641 S.E.2d at 91.
274. Hyland 11, 277 Va. at 44-45, 670 S.E.2d at 749. In reaching this conclusion, the
circuit court identified the president's first statement as having two separate factual com-
ponents: (1) "[w]hether Hyland led the protest of the TSS contract award and the TSA pro-
curement and was responsible for 'these visible losses,'" and (2) whether "losses from those
projects created gaps in the company's plans and the financial performance of the business
units which she oversaw." Id. at 45, 670 S.E.2d at 749. Because the plaintiff admitted that
she "oversaw the efforts of the proposal team's support to the [TSS] protest," was the "Pro-
posal Manager" in charge of acquiring the contract, and that the loss of the TSS contract
"created a shortfall" and "left a gap in sales revenue," the circuit court found that the pres-
ident's statement was true and thus, not defamatory as a matter of law. Id. at 45, 670
S.E.2d at 749-50. Similarly, with regards to the president's second statement, the circuit
court determined that the factual component of the statement was "[w] hether the business
unit missed its goals by the stated percentages," and not whether the plaintiff was to
blame. Id. at 45, 670 S.E.2d at 750. Because the plaintiff conceded that the president's
characterization of the extent of losses for 2002 was correct, the circuit court found that
this factual component was also true, and as such, the statement was not defamatory. Id.
at 45-46, 670 S.E.2d at 750.
275. Id. at 46, 670 S.E.2d at 750-51.
276. Id. at 49, 670 S.E.2d at 752.
277. Id. at 47, 670 S.E.2d at 750-51.
278. Id., 670 S.E.2d at 751.
279. Id. at 48, 670 S.E.2d at 751.
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that the statement is false.20 Consequently, the trial judge may
only award summary judgment to a defendant on grounds that
allegedly defamatory statements are true, only when a plaintiff
unequivocally admits the truth of the statements, including the
fair inferences, implications, and insinuations that can be drawn
from the statements. 281 Although the plaintiff in Hyland conceded
the truth of certain factual components of the president's state-
ments, she did not concede the truth of the inferences or implica-
tions arising from these statements. 282 "By awarding summary
judgment to Raytheon in the absence of such admissions, the cir-
cuit court deprived Hyland of the opportunity to present evidence
to a jury to establish the falsity of the alleged defamatory state-
ments" and to have the jury consider the harmful effect of the
president's statements as a whole. 283
VIII. SIGNIFICANT LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
Few developments or changes in labor and employment law oc-
curred in the General Assembly this past year. One significant
development was a bill providing that military members' spouses
who quit their jobs if the military member is transferred to a new
location may be eligible for unemployment benefits. 24 In addition,
employers now face different requirements for paying employees
through debit cards,285 and minors at least seventeen-years-old
may drive or assist drivers of trucks and commercial vehicles if
they meet several requirements.286 Finally, Virginia enacted new
"mini-COBRA" legislation to ensure that the federal subsidy for
COBRA premiums is also available to small health plans not cov-
ered by COBRA. 287 However, a bill that would have had greater
impact on Virginia employers-by prohibiting employers from
asking existing or prospective employees about their arrest and
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 48-49, 670 S.E.2d at 751-52.
283. Id. at 49, 670 S.E.2d at 752.
284. S.B. 1495, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2009) (enacted as Act of May 6, 2009, ch.
878, 2009 Va. Acts ____).
285. See VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-29(B) (Cum. Supp. 2009).
286. VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-100(A)(7) (Cum. Supp. 2009).
287. Act of Apr. 8, 2009, ch. 796, 2009 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 38.2-3541.1 (Cum. Supp. 2009)).
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conviction records older than eight years or about non-violent fe-
lonies-failed to emerge from the House.28
A. Unemployment Compensation for Military Spouses
A new law passed by the Virginia General Assembly provides
that good cause for leaving employment exists for individuals who
leave voluntarily to accompany spouses on active duty in the
United States military to a new location following a military-
related assignment.29 Where good cause exists, the individual is
eligible to receive unemployment benefits; to qualify, the individ-
ual's place of employment must not be readily accessible from the
new location. 290 This statute applies only if the state to which the
spouse is transferred does not have a statute providing that an
individual in a similar situation would be leaving work without
good cause.29, This law will become effective only if the federal
government appropriates funds for this purpose. 292
B. Payment of Wages and Salaries by Debit Cards
The General Assembly amended Virginia Code section 40.1-29
to allow employers to pay employees hired after January 1, 2010
by credit to a prepaid debit card or card account even if "such em-
ployee has not affirmatively consented" to that method of pay-
ment, but only if the employee fails to designate an account to
which wages can be deposited through electronic automated fund
transfer.2 93 To avail itself of this method of payment, the employer
must
arrange[ I for such card or card account to be issued through a net-
work system through which the employee shall have the ability to
make at least one free withdrawal or transfer per pay period, which
withdrawal may be for any sum in such card or card account as the
288. See H.B. 1815, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2009).
289. See Act of May 6, 2009, ch. 878, 2009 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 60.2-528 (Cum. Supp. 2009)).
290. VA. CODE ANN. § 60.2-528(C)(9)(iii) (Cum. Supp. 2009).
291. Id. § 60.2-528(C)(9)(iv) (Cum. Supp. 2009).
292. Id. § 60.2-528(C)(9)(iv) ed. note (Cum. Supp. 2009).
293. Act of Mar. 30, 2009, ch. 728, 2009 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 40.1-29(B) (Cum. Supp. 2009)).
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employee may elect, using such card or card account at financial in-
stitutions participating in such network system.
29 4
For employees hired before January 1, 2010 and those who
provide an account suitable for electronic automated fund trans-
fer, employers must continue to provide full written disclosure
and obtain affirmative consent before paying wages through a de-
bit card.295 Prior to this amendment, employers could only pay
employees through debit cards without consent if the employee
(1) worked at a facility operating amusement devices under Vir-
ginia Code section 36-98.3 and (2) failed to provide an account. 296
C. Employment of Minors
Finally, amendments to Virginia Code section 40.1-100 expand
employment opportunities for children at least seventeen-years-
old wanting to drive or assist those who drive trucks and com-
mercial vehicles. 297 Prior to the amendments, children seventeen
years and older could drive (or assist those who drive) trucks and
commercial vehicles with two axles or less. 29 Although the
amendment removes the axle limitation, it imposes a number of
other requirements.2 99 The General Assembly also amended Vir-
ginia Code section 40.1-100 to allow seventeen-year-olds to drive
(or assist those who drive) trucks and commercial vehicles on
public highways if, among other requirements, the driving occurs
during daylight hours, takes place within a thirty-mile radius of
the employee's place of employment, and is only occasional and
incidental to the employee's employment.300
D. Virginia's Mini-COBRA Legislation
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of
2009 amended the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1985 ("COBRA") to provide a premium subsidy for certain
294. VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-29(B) (Cum. Supp. 2009).
295. Id.
296. Id. § 40.1-29 (Repl. Vol. 2002).
297. Act of Mar. 27, 2009, ch. 218, 2009 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 40.1-100(A)(7) (Cum. Supp. 2009)).
298. VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-100(A)(7) (Repl. Vol. 2002).
299. Act of Mar. 27, 2009, ch. 218, 2009 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 40.1-100(A)(7) (Cum. Supp. 2009)).
300. Id.
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individuals who lose health coverage in connection with an invo-
luntary termination.30 1 This amendment affects all employers
sponsoring a group health plan that have terminated or laid off
an employee on or after September 1, 2008.30 Because COBRA
does not apply to small health plans where the employ-
er sponsoring the plan has fewer than twenty employees, 03 the
General Assembly enacted Virginia Code section 38.2-3541.1 on
April 8, 2009, to ensure this new premium subsidy would be
available to small health plans not covered by COBRA.30 4 Virginia
Code section 38.2-3541.1 requires that certain employees of small
employers, whose group health insurance coverage does not pro-
vide for continuation of coverage under COBRA, be offered the
option to continue their existing group health insurance coverage
for up to nine months following termination or notification pur-
suant to the statute.30 5 Virginia employees are eligible for this
premium assistance subsidy if they (1) are involuntarily termi-
nated between September 1, 2008 and December 31, 2009;
(2) have 2009 annual income less than $145,000 for individuals
and $250,000 for joint filers; (3) have a right to continued
coverage under the provisions of COBRA or Virginia's Mini-
COBRA; and (4) are ineligible for Medicare or coverage under
another group plan.3 16
IX. CONCLUSION
While there are several recent developments in labor and
employment law in the federal arena, there are few significant
changes at the state level, either judicially or legislatively. While
employees bringing retaliation claims might enjoy expanded
opportunities in federal court, employees advancing claims under
the ADEA will be confronted with a higher burden to avoid
summary judgment. With regard to non-competition agreements,
301. Pub. L. No. 115-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009).
302. See id. § 3001(a)(3), 123 Stat. at 457.
303. See 29 U.S.C. § 1161(b) (2006).
304. Act of Apr. 8, 2009, ch. 796, 2009 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 38.2-3541.1 (Cum. Supp. 2009)).
305. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-3521.1(A)(1) (Cum. Supp. 2009).
306. Id. § 38.2-3521.1. This section incorporates the eligibility requirements of the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, §§ 139C(b), 3001(a),
123 Stat. 115, 455-65 (2009).
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although Virginia remains an employer-friendly state, Virginia
courts continue to disfavor restrictive covenants. Finally, the
General Assembly passed few laws that will impact the labor and
employment field this past year.
